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Abstract  
The aim of this review article is to reveal the cons and pros of ethical relativism, especially 
conventionalism. This article is written with the intention of showing some of the practical upshots of 
conventionalism without totally denying some of its virtues in a world where diversity of cultures and 
customs is apparent. The article inquires the question: Is ethical relativism tenable? The review article 
relies on reviewing secondary sources. What I am arguing in this article is that despite the attraction of 
ethical relativism as an intellectual weapon to fight against ethnocentrism and cultural intolerance, the 
view still goes against the idea of intercultural comparison, criticism and moral argumentation, so that it 
would have serious disastrous implication on practice, especially on the universal character of human 
rights and shutters all together any sort of moral progress and reform. The article concludes that we can 
set forth certain objective moral codes, discovered through rational intercultural dialogue and discussion 
which could be applied regardless of cultural specificities upon which cultural inter-comparison, 
discussion and moral argumentation is possible. 
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Introduction 
Are moral codes/principles binding upon all rational creatures? Are there moral principles which 
are universally applied for all societies at all time? These questions have been occupying a prominent 
place in the discussion about morality. The debate about morality – whether there are objective moral 
principles or not – has had a long history in moral discourse. In this review article, I, therefore, set out a 
discussion about morality, that is, whether there are objective moral codes which are applied for all 
societies at all time or not.  
 
People have answered the questions, in a nutshell, in two different ways. Some people, 
philosophers and other people alike, claiming that there are objective moral principles which transcend 
cultural circumstances, and are universally binding upon everyone at all times. In the opposite side of the 
debate, some philosophers take the stance of ethical relativism and endorse the view that moral codes and 
principles are culture bound and also denounce the existence of culture transcendent moral codes and 
principles.  
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Ethical Relativism Vs. Ethical Objectivism 
I enunciate my discussion with ethical relativism. Ethical relativism is a doctrine which denies the 
existence of overarching and objective moral codes and principles to be applied for all people at all time. 
The theory instead contends that morality is relative to culture and individual choice. Ethical relativism 
contends that moral principles have truth value – they can be said either true or false. However the 
criterion of their truth value is the individual or the folkways and mores of a society from which they are 
articulated. The upshot of ethical relativism is that the validity of moral truths can be ascertained not by 
any objective and universal moral principle, as there are no any. To put it in other words, ethical 
relativism affirms the existence of various moral codes which are equally valid, for there are no 
independent and objective moral principles by which a cultural value may be appraised. 
 
There are two versions of ethical relativism: conventionalism and subjectivism. Conventionalism 
holds the view that the codes of morality are relative to a culture or society. Subjectivism holds that the 
validity of moral principles is determined by individual choice. The individual person makes ethical 
decisions about what is morally good and bad and is responsible to set up his/her own principles. For the 
purpose of the scope of this study, I am elucidating the view of cultural relativism (conventionalism). 
 
 
Conventional Ethical Relativism 
Conventionalism, as a strand within ethical relativism, emphasizes on societal norms and values 
to be the locus of moral standards and codes. What is counted morally right and wrong is largely 
determined by cultural mores and folkways. As the theory elucidates, morality is socially embedded and it 
is only from the standpoint of cultural practices that the validity of any moral standard is judged. The 
theory affirms that different cultures and societies have different standards of morally right and wrong 
actions. Conventional ethical relativism rejects the existence of objective standards in the realm of 
morality from the fact that different societies have different moral standards. There is no one objective 
and overarching moral standard applied across all cultures/societies at all times. Instead there are different 
moral codes which are deeply ingrained in cultural circumstances. Philosopher – John Ladd defines 
conventional ethical relativism as follows: 
 
Ethical relativism is the doctrine that the moral rightness of actions varies from society to 
society and there are no absolute universal moral standards binding in all men at all times. 
Accordingly, it holds that whether or not it is right for an individual to act in a certain way 
depends on or is relative to the society to which he belongs (quoted in Pojman, 2001:257). 
 
Pojman (2001:257) analyzes the view of conventional ethical relativism by identifying two theses 
which are actually related to each other. (1) A diversity thesis specifies that what is considered right and 
wrong varies from society to society, so that no moral principles are accepted by all societies and (2) A 
dependency thesis specifies that all moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance. The 
dependency thesis makes the point clear that what is morally right and wrong/the validity of moral actions 
is determined by the cultural context from which they are ingrained. What one should do and should not 
do wouldn’t be determined by culture transcendent objective moral values, for all standards are 
conditioned by cultural circumstances. A similar idea is expressed by Pojman about the absence of culture 
transcendent moral standards. He says, “[t]rying to see things from an independent, non-cultural point of 
view would be like taking out our eyes to examine their contours and qualities” (Ibid). If there are 
different moral principles from culture to culture and if all morality is rooted in culture, then it follows 
that no universal moral principles are valid for all cultures and peoples at all times. 
 
We have come to see enormous variety in social practices throughout the world. We have come to 
know through the works of anthropologists that different culture and communities have different 
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standards of behavior to judge what is morally right and wrong. Anthropologists have repeatedly reported 
that moral values are bound to cultural factors and are also deemed to be appraised by the standards which 
are embedded within the culture itself. In a word, societies have different conception about the good. 
What is believed to be “good” in a certain society might be wrong in other culture and society and culture. 
Conventionalism, therefore, rejects moral standards which are culture transcendent and universally 
applied everywhere at all times. 
 
Examples which reflect the diversity and even at times conflicting and contradictory moral 
standards/codes are ample from the works of various anthropologists and sociologists. For example, 
Eskimos allow their elderly to die due to starvation, but the same act might seem to be abhorrent and 
morally condemned for most of others. In some societies female infanticide and polygamy are common 
and dominant social practices whereas in other cultures these acts might seem to be immoral ways of 
behavior. Anthropologist Ruth Bendict, for instance, carried out empirical research in a tribe in 
Melanesia. In the study she found out that the tribal community views cooperation and kindness as vices.  
Therefore, she concludes that what is considered to be normal and abnormal about human moral conduct 
is ingrained within culturally accepted habits. Another anthropologist, Collin Terbull has documented that 
the IK in northern Uganda have no sense of duty towards their children or parents.  
   
 
Critical Evaluation of Conventionalism  
Relativism, as a non-normative ethical doctrine, has got much attention in recent years for its 
celebration of pluralism in the sphere of customs and values. It is, indeed, deemed to be an effective 
intellectual tool to uproot the domination of one culture by another, and, in effect, it fosters the virtue of 
tolerance. Historical evidences disclose that the cultures of various societies and tribes in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America have been characterized as being “primitive” and “irrational,” and deemed by some 
“moral reformers” to stump them out from the moral scene under the guise of “civilization” and moral 
progress. However, the theory can make sense in promoting people to view cultures and norms other than 
their own with a sense of respect and to be open-minded at least in a manner that it opens the forum for 
people to engage in open discussion and argumentation. 
 
 
The virtue of Conventionalism 
 
The reason why ethical relativism has increasingly been so popular since the second half of the 
20th century onwards, albeit its disastrous practical implication, is that the theory’s firm stance to 
undermine any form of ethnocentrism and cultural domination under the guise of objective moral 
standards, promoting the virtue of tolerance and open-mindedness. It would be, indeed, unfair to 
completely denounce ethical relativism, for we can find some grain of truth in it. The merit is actually 
related with its ability to animate people to be open-minded towards the customs and values of various 
societies other than their own. The theory rightly puts us in guard against the danger of interpreting the 
values of “others” from a parochial sense of one’s customs and values. “It [cultural relativism] seems to 
be an enlightened response to the ‘sins of ethnocentrism,’ and it seems to entail or strongly imply an 
attitude of tolerance toward other cultures” (Pojman: 2001:261). Bendict also discusses about the antidote 
of cultural relativism towards cultural arrogance. She says: 
 
We shall arrive at a more realistic social faith, accepting as grounds of hope and as new basis 
for tolerance the coexisting and equal patterns of life which mankind has created for itself 
from the raw materials of existence (quoted in Pojman, 2001:261). 
 
Accordingly, ethical conventionalism warns us not to assume that all our preferences are rational 
objective way of doing things. Some of our preferences are just ingrained to our social circumstances. 
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There are some cultural practices which are, indeed, the result of cultural setups, and are limited in their 
scope of application to that society only. Many (but not all) of our preferences are just ingrained to our 
social circumstances. It would be, in fact, unjustified to assume that all our preferences and values, which 
are rooted only and are justified in our society, to be rational objective values applied for all cultures. 
 
Cultural arrogance, at least in part, is the result of assuming one’s local values and preferences to 
be objectively true for everyone. Some preferences are justified only in terms of the culture from which 
they are articulated. Attempting to appraise the culture of “others” based on one’s own cultural factors is 
what the theory is fighting for- and, in effect, belittles the danger of assuming one’s preferences are 
neither moral nor immoral. For instance, a publically exposed breast is scandalous in our society, whereas 
in other cultures it is unremarkable. Objectively speaking, it is neither right nor wrong- there is no 
objective reason why either custom is better (Rachels, 2002: 562). “Many (but not all) our practices are 
merely peculiar to our society, it is easy to lose sight of that fact. In reminding us of it, the theory does a 
service” (Ibid).  
 
 
Weaknesses of Conventionalism 
 
Despite these positive virtues attached with ethical relativism, the theory has also grave and 
disastrous practical implications, which in turn, belittle its significance as a comprehensive ethical theory. 
Cultural tolerance, as antidote for ethnocentrism, indeed, backfires with cultural relativism. By elevating 
the virtue of tolerance, as an antidote for cultural arrogance, relativists would seem to be endorsing the 
objective existence of moral codes- at least one, that is, tolerance. How could a relativist make a 
persuasive argument to refute any sort of intolerant behavior, given that right and wrong are culturally 
defined? Tolerance is a moral concept, and by accepting it, relativists would seem to have endorsed the 
stance of moral objectivism that there are objective moral truths. How one would be compelled to have a 
tolerant behavior towards other cultures, provided that moral standards are nothing but merely cultural 
conventions. Suppose that society A doesn’t have the moral principle related with tolerance, and, in 
effect, either accepts intolerance as something good or remains indifferent. How would, then, a relativist 
be able to claim that cultural tolerance is better than intolerance. “[F]rom a relativistic point of view, there 
is no more reason to be tolerant than to be intolerant, and neither stance is objectively morally better than 
the other” (Pojman, 2001:260). A relativist would not be able to persuade people to hold universally the 
virtue of tolerance, unless recognizing the existence of objective and culture transcendent moral 
standards, such as tolerance. Relativists would never be able to offer a basis for criticizing those who are 
intolerant. 
 
Another difficulty associated with ethical relativism is that it undercuts the possibility of cultural 
inter comparison. According to the theory, right and wrong are determined by appealing to the customs’ 
of one’s society; as a result it would, then, completely shatter the possibility, in any way, to stamp out 
sterile elements from a culture. The upshot of ethical relativism is that it undermines any attempt to 
criticize less benign elements from a culture, for it denies the existence of culture transcendent objective 
moral standards. How can intercultural comparison and criticism possible if all moral standards and 
percepts are culturally rooted. If what is right and wrong is a matter of cultural acceptance, then there is 
little- or almost no- ground or basis to make intercultural comparison and moral criticism. In fact, its 
upshot is very detrimental. Hitler’s genocidal actions, as long as they were culturally accepted, were as 
morally legitimate as Mather Teresa’s work of mercy. “If conventional relativism is accepted racism, 
genocide of unpopular minorities, oppression of the poor, slavery, and even the advocacy of war for its 
own sake are equally as moral as their opposites” (Pojman,2001: 260). If we took cultural relativism 
seriously, we would have to admit that these social practices also are immune from criticism.  
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Another serious flaw imputed with cultural relativism is its inability to offer a clear conception 
and meaning about a culture or society. To put it in other words, a further difficulty imputed with cultural 
relativism is related with the meaning of a culture or society upon which the theory exclusively relies on. 
According to cultural relativism, right and wrong are determined by cultural standards. However, due to 
modern life – high level of social stratification and specialization – the theory is highly dubious to make a 
clear conception about society or community. A person might belong to more than one community at a 
time, and which often might happen to be conflicting and contradictory, as a result determining to which 
group the person belongs – to evaluate his\her action - would not easily be tenable. Suppose that a person 
may belong to two different cultures, that is, culture A and culture B at a time. And often the two cultures 
happen to be contradictory. And, hence, by which culture should the actions of the person be evaluated, 
that is, should the actions of the person be judged by culture A or culture B?   
 
Suppose that someone might be a member of a certain religious community as well as member of 
the larger society, and in particular matters the two communities, to which the individual simultaneously 
belong, might uphold contradictory and conflicting values. As a member of a certain religious community 
the individual might espouse a value against abortion but which might be at odds with the value of the 
larger society, approves of abortion. How would a conventionalist resolve this inconsistency? Pojman 
(2001:263) rightly puts the flaw of conventionalism, especially with regard to the possibility of a person 
to be a member of different conflicting communities, as “[r]elativism would seem to tell us that where a 
person is a member of societies with conflicting moralities, he/she must be judged both wrong and not- 
wrong, whatever he/she does.”  
 
A relativist would seem to reply the objection by saying that the person, who belongs to different 
social groupings, may decide to which group he/she principally belongs. The nuisance with this option is 
that it seems to lead back to counterintuitive results (Ibid). By such principle a person may validate any 
morally reprehensible act, such as murder just by aligning himself to a community that approves the act, 
rather than the community that disapprove of it. If conventionalism were true, wouldn’t one justify 
anything merely by forming a small subculture? How large must the group be to make up a legitimate 
subculture or society? Does it need ten or fifteen people? How about just three? (Ibid) 
 
Relativism does have another serious negative implication, that is, it makes moral progress and 
reform deplorable. If conventional relativism were true, those individuals who are passionate to make 
moral reform or improve their society would seem to be treated as immoral. How does conventionalism 
consider the status of moral reformers, such as Jesus, Lincoln, Gandhi and Mandela, who had the courage 
to go against the tide of their respective cultural yardstick? In the past when slavery was the order of the 
day, defying the status quo, as what Lincoln vehemently did, would seem to have been treated as immoral 
and wrong. Similarly, Mandela, a visionary social and political reformer, spent much of his life time in 
fighting against racism and apartheid would seem to have been immoral if relativism were correct. In a 
word, Mandela was wrong in fighting racial discrimination and social and political injustice. Pojman 
(2001:261), however, describes the zeal of the moral reformer as follows:  
 
Yet we normally feel just the opposite, that the reformer is the courageous innovator who is 
right, who has the truth, against the mindless majority. Sometimes the individual must stand 
alone with the truth, risking social censure and persecution…Yet if relativism is correct, the 
opposite is necessarily the case. Truth is with the crowd and error with the individual.   
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Ethical relativism is the doctrine that denies that there is a single moral standard that is 
universally applicable to all people at all times. Relativists deny that there exists only one moral code, 
law, principle, or standard. They insist that there are many moral codes, which take root in diverse social 
soils and environments. As the name implies, ethical relativists insist that any morality is relative to time, 
place and circumstances in which it occurs. The attraction of cultural relativism is not as much appealing 
as it seems to be on the surface, for it has serious practical disastrous implication without overlooking 
some of its virtues. Such problems include, the problem of defining a culture, problems related with the 
place of a reformer, the impossibility of moral criticism and argumentation. 
 
In order to understand ethical relativism, one must first be aware that there is a difference 
between ethical absolutism and ethical objectivism. Ethical absolutism, which this article denounces, is 
the doctrine that there exists one and only one non-overridable moral code. The view which denies the 
existence of only one non- overridable moral code that could be applied at all times and place reflects the 
tenet of ethical objectivism. Absolutists maintain that this code applies for everyone, at all times, 
everywhere. What is a moral duty for me must also be a duty for you. What is a moral duty for an 
American must also be a moral duty for an Asian, African, European, and Aborigine. If euthanasia is 
wrong, it is wrong for everyone, at all times, everywhere. That a society may see nothing wrong with 
euthanasia or lying or cannibalism in no way affects the rightness or wrongness of such actions. Ethical 
objectivists do not necessarily claim that their interpretation of the absolute standard is the true and valid 
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